

CAN DEMOCRACY BE TAUGHT?

Steven E. Finkel

Steven E. Finkel is professor of politics at the University of Virginia. He has published extensively on issues related to civic education, democratic values, and political participation in advanced and new democracies. In 2002–2003, he was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. For more information on the technical aspects of the study on which this essay is based, visit www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/Finkel-14-4.pdf.

Does civic education work? Can it teach people in emerging democracies the values, skills, and attitudes that they need to take an active part in governing themselves? Donor organizations in the United States and Europe clearly think it can: In recent decades, they have spent large sums in many countries to craft new school curricula, teach women their rights, train prospective new voters, and show citizens how to band together and approach local officials for help in solving community problems.¹ The general aim has been to strengthen democratic political culture by showing citizens why they should support democratic norms and values, by improving their knowledge of how democratic politics works, and by encouraging them to become more active in public matters.

While there is a growing scholarly literature that tries to gauge the effectiveness of civic education for children and young adults in developing democracies, similar studies of adults are much rarer.² To help fill this gap, this study assesses the effects of adult civic education programs in South Africa, the Dominican Republic, and Poland on political participation as well as on levels of such key “democratic” traits as trust, political tolerance, and sense of one’s own efficacy as a citizen. In many fledgling democracies, low participation, intolerance, political ignorance, and alienation are major systemic problems. An investigation such as the present one, therefore, has the important primary goal

of illuminating whether civic education is a promising means for stimulating greater citizen engagement, and the secondary goal of telling us the conditions under which such programs are most or least effective.

More generally, the investigation of civic education's impact can shed light on important issues in the study of political culture and democratic consolidation. Can short-term stimuli such as civic education programs even affect basic political orientations? Do civil society groups, which are so often the main vehicles of civic education in new democracies, serve to integrate ordinary citizens into the political process and foster salutary democratic attitudes, or are they—as some critics charge—ineffective or even counterproductive agents of democratic cultural change?

The study began in the Dominican Republic and Poland in 1997, with a follow-on study a year later in South Africa.³ In each country, two to four civic education programs were selected for evaluation, ranging from a program conducted by the Dominican group ADOPEM that trained women in human rights and democratic values, to a program in community problem solving and self-governance sponsored by the Polish group Foundation for Support of Local Democracy (FSLD), to a program conducted by the South African group Lawyers for Human Rights that trained individuals in constitutional awareness and democratic rights. (See the box on page 146 for a complete list of the programs that were included in the study.) At the core of the study was a survey administered by professional research firms to a sample of individuals trained in each program as well as to a demographically similar “control group” of their compatriots who had no involvement in civic education.⁴ The questionnaire measured democratic participation and knowledge as well as support for democratic values, institutions, and processes. Comparing the responses of those who were and were not exposed to civic education—with appropriate statistical allowances made for such potentially confounding factors as education, age, gender, political interest, and group memberships—would show whether exposure to civic education had made a difference in the way these people thought, felt, and behaved.

The study looked for civic education's impact on three areas that experts have long described as essential components of democratic citizenship. The first area is that of “civic competence,” a shorthand phrase meant to sum up the political knowledge, civic skills, and perceptions of one's own political influence (“efficacy”) that undergird democratic participation. The second area is that of adherence to such democratic values and norms as political tolerance, meaning the extent to which citizens are willing to extend procedural democratic liberties to individuals and groups with whom they may disagree; institutional trust, meaning the willingness to support (albeit perhaps critically and skeptically) basic social and political institutions; and support for democracy as a form of government preferable to other political systems. The third area is demo-

cratic participation (especially local participation) by individuals, which civic education is of course supposed to foster.

What Can Civic Education Do?

Much traditional scholarship on political culture holds that civic education should have relatively little impact. According to this view, the democratic transformation of an entire society's attitudes and values is the work of decades, and requires the action of large structural forces, such as economic modernization and generational succession, as well as sustained experience with democratic institutions and responsible behavior by opposition and governing elites in turning over power and the like. Moreover, students of political socialization often argue that orientations learned early in life "structure" adult attitudes and hence limit the extent to which short-term stimuli can change basic values and preferences. If the above theories are true, it obviously follows that a relatively fleeting encounter with civic education later in life is not going to make much difference when weighed against the vast influence exerted by large socioeconomic factors and early socialization experiences.

In contrast to this relatively static view of political culture, other more recent research suggests that democratic political orientations are, if not wholly malleable, influenced to a considerable degree by short-term political, economic, and experiential factors. A steady stream of findings over the past several decades has shown that variables such as the individual's perceptions of current economic conditions, assessments of governmental competence, and experiences with governmental authority can affect democratic orientations such as tolerance, social and institutional trust, and political efficacy. The widespread demonstration of such effects has led many scholars to conclude that, although early socialization and social-structural factors play a role in determining democratic attitudes, adult political experiences matter as well.⁵ There is substantial evidence that attitudes such as political tolerance, traditionally viewed as deeply rooted and relatively impervious to change, can be influenced by new information and efforts at political persuasion, as well as by short-term economic, political, and contextual factors.⁶ Clearly, such a view of how attitudes form and change would lead one to harbor greater hopes for the potential of civic education to foster prodemocratic orientations.

Nor is this the only reason for optimism. Another comes from the prominent role that secondary associations and other civil society groups play in conducting adult civic education. Much recent academic research has emphasized how active mobilization efforts by parties, secondary groups, and social networks can stimulate individual political behavior in fledgling as well as established democracies. Such groups and networks, moreover, can also be important conduits of political information as well as reinforcers of "social capital" and such prodemocratic qualities as tol-

erance and trust (both interpersonal and institutional).⁷ The messages delivered via civic education may resonate with the mobilization and learning processes that also take place within social-network and associational contexts to promote democratic attitudes, values, and behavior. Participation, too, may therefore benefit, since many adult civic education programs are run by what Thomas Carothers calls “advocacy NGOs”—reformist groups with more explicitly political agendas and stronger mobilizational intentions than traditional secondary associations normally have. Individuals in these kinds of civic training programs typically experience strong cues to get politically involved for the sake of the group’s agenda.

None of this is beyond debate, of course. Much work has found that group memberships have no effect or even a negative effect on the incidence and intensity of prodemocratic attitudes and values. Certainly, it is not written in stone that groups of like-minded individuals must promote tolerance and trust: Indeed they may do just the opposite when it comes to those outside the social network.

It should also be noted that advocacy NGOs and other civic groups, precisely because they do “take sides,” may sometimes promote *dis-trust* of current political institutions as part of a perceived mission to oppose potentially nondemocratic state power. Further, several recent works on democracy promotion have severely criticized such groups for representing narrow (often elite and nonindigenous) slices of civil society, for existing only because of Western funding, and for being potentially corrupt and badly run.⁸ If such critiques are accurate, the effects of these groups on democratic attitudes and participation may fall well short of the optimistic expectations described above.

Key Findings

The most important finding from the study is the relatively large effect of civic education training on political participation.⁹ In all three countries, individuals who were exposed to civic education were significantly more active in local politics than were individuals in the control group, and by margins wider than those found anywhere else in our study.

Among the three countries, the largest effect was seen in Poland, where civic education exposure doubled the rate of participation in local politics. In the Dominican Republic and South Africa, civic education’s effects on participation were more moderate, but were still greater than on any of the other six democratic orientations or behaviors measured. The findings confirm that conducting civic education through secondary associations has substantial mobilizational effects. In other words, exposure to training programs in democracy translates directly into increased involvement in the political system.

Closer scrutiny of the types of programs involved yields an important dis-

tion. Those that focus directly on local problem solving and community action and that provide opportunities for individuals to interact with local officials (examples include GAD's [see p. 146] program in the Dominican Republic and FSLD's in Poland) do far more to increase participation than do general information-based sessions (such as those of ADOPEM in the Dominican Republic as well as the three South African programs studied). To a degree, the former programs' superiority may be attributable to the higher number of sessions they feature as well as the more creative teaching methods they use. But some of the difference also springs from their character as open exercises in political mobilization: Individuals are brought together with the goal of solving a problem close to home; they make contact with local leaders, learning in the process how to get involved at the local level. The heightened participation that the trainees show once they leave the program reflects both the skills they learned and the specific knowledge they gained of how to use them. Civic education, then, can have powerful behavioral effects when it is conducted through secondary associations that are actively engaged in local problem solving, community organizing, and collective political action.

When we shift focus from participation to civic competence and support for democratic values, civic education's effects are not as powerful or consistent. This is true across all three countries. For example, when it came to 1) expressing support for democratic elections in South Africa and the Dominican Republic, and 2) knowledge of political leaders and institutions in South Africa, the differences between individuals who had been through civic education and those who had not were statistically insignificant. And yet civic education did increase individuals' awareness of the political process in the Dominican Republic and Poland, and in all three countries it bolstered the core democratic orientations of political efficacy and tolerance.

These changes, especially in South Africa and the Dominican Republic, were too small to justify the idea that civic education alone made people feel fundamentally more influential or more willing to respect the procedural liberties of unpopular groups. But the results are encouraging, especially given the long-held view of many scholars that these orientations, and especially that of tolerance, change slowly if at all. After traditional factors such as education and media exposure, civic education was one of the strongest predictors of an individual's level of political tolerance in all three countries. The results from each country also suggest that taking part in civic education does more to increase tolerance than does belonging to traditional civil society groups such as churches or religious organizations, youth or hobby groups, or unions. In other words, advocacy NGOs and other organizations that "do" civic education can be promising developers of democratic values as well as effective mobilizers of participation.

Interestingly, civic education produced significantly *more* trust in political institutions in South Africa, and significantly *less* institutional trust in the Dominican Republic. Indeed, in the latter country, the magnitude of


civic education's negative effect on trust rivaled that of its positive effect on participation. These patterns likely reflect the greater awareness that civic education provides about the "objective" performance of each country's political institutions and processes. They also point, again, to the crucial importance of the NGOs that are doing the educating, for the results seem to reflect these groups' respective attitudes toward the government. The groups in the Dominican Republic argued that the incumbent administration had stolen the 1994 election and compiled a record of repression and corruption. This oppositionist posture can be seen in the program's training materials, which focused on mobilizing citizens around their grievances and demands for reform.¹⁰ In South Africa, by contrast, the cognate NGOs offering civic education had often been part of the anti-apartheid struggle, and strongly favored the new over the old South African government.

How and How Often? Methods and Frequency

Viewing civic education in light of theories about political mobilization and attitudinal change suggests that effects may differ along with the types of programs and individuals involved. For example, much research in social psychology suggests that role playing helps significantly to drive attitudinal and behavioral change, as individuals adopt attitudes and ways of thinking that are consistent with the behaviors that they are acting out. If this research is correct, civic education programs that use active methods—not only role playing but also other types of dramatization, group decision-making exercises, and the like—will exert more potent effects on individual orientations. Likewise, more intensive programs featuring more frequent sessions should yield more powerful effects than do one-time exercises.

Previous academic work also suggests that individuals with greater motivation and political resources will be more susceptible to mobilization efforts by groups and social networks. Civic education should have greater effects on these individuals, since they will be better positioned to grasp the value and attitudinal messages of such education and to integrate them into existing (or emerging) democratic belief systems. In sum, greater effects should be in evidence when an individual receives civic education more often; learns by using participatory means; and has sufficient resources, motivation, and cognitive skills to integrate and act on the training. The results from Poland, South Africa, and the Dominican Republic all strongly confirm these expectations. Figures 1 and 2 show the effects of training frequency and exposure to participatory methods on local political participation and tolerance, respectively. These variables are selected for illustrative purposes; figures charting the four other orientations reveal generally similar results. Each graph shows the predicted amount of local-level participation (or tolerance) for three groups: the control group plus two different sub-


FIGURE 1—CIVIC EDUCATION AND LOCAL-LEVEL PARTICIPATION



groups within the treatment group. In the first graph for each country, the treatment group is divided according to whether individuals reported attending one or two civic education workshops or whether they attended three or more sessions. In the second graph, the treatment group is divided according to individuals' reported exposure to participatory teaching methods such as role playing, simulations, mock elections, and the like during the civic education sessions, with one subgroup comprising individuals who were exposed to three or fewer of these methods, and the other subgroup comprising those exposed to four or more.

The results for local participation show that in all three countries more frequent exposure to civic education is associated with increased

FIGURE 2—CIVIC EDUCATION AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE



participation. Individuals who attended at least some sessions are more inclined to participation than are their fellows in the control group, and individuals who attended civic education most frequently are even more engaged in local political activity. More extensive exposure to the participatory messages of the civics curricula, as well as the mobilizing influence of the groups doing the training, leads directly to more participation in local politics. Similarly, the more intensive and participatory the training itself, the more local political activity by graduates is in evidence; people who “practice” participation while undergoing civic education are gaining skills they can bring to bear outside that setting.

The pattern shown in Figure 2 for political tolerance is perhaps

even more striking. In all three countries, an increase in tolerance occurs *only* when individuals have attended three or more sessions. This kind of “threshold effect” is seen in South Africa and Poland for participatory methodologies as well: Individuals must be trained using methods that actively involve them if civic education is to have any discernible impact. When it comes to improving an individual’s democratic orientations, the frequency and quality of the democracy training which that individual receives are crucial. These findings confirm that, under the right conditions, civic education can have significant effects even on “tough to sell” democratic values such as tolerance. Conversely, the findings also mean that if conditions are not right, the effects of civic education will be substantially weakened.

Resources, Motivation, and Cognitive Skills

Conjecturing that differences among individuals would have implications for civic education, I calculated the effect of such education on local-level political participation for individuals with different demographic and political characteristics: individuals who belong to zero, one, or more than one secondary association such as a peasant, labor, church or professional group; the young (18 to 34 years old) and the older (35 and above); high-school graduates and those with less than a high-school education; and individuals who scored in the lower half of each country’s distribution on political interest and those in the upper half. The results confirm that civic education has greater effects on individuals who already have higher levels of participation and cognitive resources.¹¹

A strong difference, for example, is seen between those who have ties to existing civil society groups and those who do not. In South Africa, exposure to civic education had no effect at all on the level of local participation by those who reported belonging to no civil society organizations. The effects were moderate for those belonging to one group, and nearly twice as large for more socially integrated individuals. The corresponding differences in Poland and the Dominican Republic follow a similar pattern. This finding again shows the importance of group-based mobilization for understanding the effects of civic education. The greatest impact is on individuals who: 1) receive reinforcement of civic education’s message from existing civil society groups to which they belong; and 2) possess more ways and means—by virtue of existing social networks—to engage the political system.

Other political and cognitive resources are also relevant. A somewhat surprising finding is that in all three countries civic education’s effect on participation is more pronounced among *older* people than among 18-to-34-year-olds. Reasons for this might include the lower levels of knowledge and other political resources found among younger indi-

Programs Studied

Dominican Republic

Participación Ciudadana (PC): A national NGO that trained young people and adults to serve as election observers in 1996.

Grupo Acción por la Democracia (GAD): A civil society mobilization program from the mid-1990s that first educated people on basic rights and obligations in a democracy, then brought them together to hold a series of forums to discuss national and local issues.

Asociación Dominicana para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (ADOPEM): A local NGO that trained women community leaders between January 1996 and January 1997 in women's rights, democratic values, democracy in the family, and self-esteem.

Radio Santa María (RSM): A mid-1990s project that trained intermediaries (typically leaders of rural towns) who then conducted civic education in their local communities.

Poland

Foundation for Support of Local Democracy (FSLD): An NGO that promotes local self-governance, primarily through training for local officials. The Civic Participation Project was implemented in 22 relatively small towns beginning in 1994 and ending in 1995. FSLD chose project leaders, who then brought together citizens in their communities to work on solving particular local problems.

DIALOG Project (also run by FSLD centers): A problem-solving project for groups and communities that began in 1991 and conducted information campaigns on key local problems, then invited citizens and government officials to workshops dealing with the issues.

South Africa

National Institute for Public Interest Law and Research (NIPILAR): The lead organization of an NGO consortium operating in the fields of rights education and public-interest law. One of the main civic education programs conducted by NIPILAR during the period under study was its women's rights program, designed to promote awareness of the United Nations Women and Children's Rights Convention.

Community Law Centre–Durban (CLC): An NGO that coordinates approximately 30 legal-advice offices in the province of KwaZulu Natal, and which conducted democracy and civic education workshops there during the period under study.

Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR): A national rights-awareness and public-interest law organization that, during the period under study, conducted workshops emphasizing the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, as well as political participation.

viduals, as well as their slighter personal experience with previous authoritarian regimes, which may make these younger citizens less receptive to arguments promoting democracy. With one notable exception, the results of the current study show that civic education exerts greater behavioral influence on individuals with higher levels of education and political interest. This pattern is familiar from studies of group mobilization, which typically find that such individuals are better able to understand and act on the participatory appeals and cues that come up in group settings.¹² The findings here indicate that mobilization efforts by civic education groups have similar effects.

The notable exception is found in the Dominican Republic, where civic education has a greater mobilizing effect on those with less rather than more schooling. In that country, however, those with a high-school education or more are less likely to be involved in local politics at all—a circumstance which means that the larger pattern, in which civics training widens existing disparities in rates of political participation, continues to hold. This pattern, again, reflects the degree to which civics training is deeply embedded in the “normal” dynamics of mobilization by groups in developing democracies.

The High Road to Better Civic Ed?

The results presented here have important implications, both theoretical and practical. The former should affect our understanding of how democratic political culture develops. The latter should point to better ways of doing civic education in fledgling democracies.

First, the study tells in many ways an optimistic story, as civic education does have moderately strong effects on individuals’ participation in politics locally, and in many instances has had significant effects on individuals’ knowledge about politics, sense of their own political efficacy, and support for democratic norms and values like political tolerance and trust in political institutions. Given the skepticism often aimed at civic education and at democracy assistance generally, these results provide evidence of larger effects than much of the existing theoretical scholarship on the topic would lead one to expect.

Second, in contrast to the theoretical view that “democratic norms are not learned through formal education and indoctrination but through experience with the democratic process,” the present findings suggest that civic education in developing democracies may be viewed as a combination of both “formal indoctrination” *and* direct experience.¹³ That is, civic education exposes individuals to both curricular instruction and group-related mobilization processes, and this combination of influences appears to be highly capable of achieving substantial short-term change in individual behavior and, in many cases, attitudes and values as well. Civic education exerted its strongest effects when formal programs brought

individuals directly into contact with local authorities or local ad hoc problem-solving organizations, as with the GAD program in the Dominican Republic and both FSLD and DIALOG in Poland. One might say that

When individuals are trained frequently and take an active part in their own learning, they will be more likely to harbor attitudes favorable toward democracy.

experience *is* indeed critical to the learning of democratic attitudes and behavior, and then add that well-conceived civic education can itself drive such “learning by doing.”

Third, the results point to the critical synergies that exist between adult civic education programs and the activities of civil society groups. Individuals who were more isolated from civil society groups were least likely to be affected by civic education. From this we may surmise that without the reinforcement of democratic norms and

political engagement that these groups supply, individuals are unlikely to translate what they learn in civics class into lasting changes in thought, attitude, or behavior. The “dense horizontal networks” of associational membership discussed in the well-known work of Robert Putnam would appear to be crucial conduits for transmitting and amplifying the democratic attitudes and behaviors that civic education seeks to deepen and spread.

Fourth, as regards the crucial variable of trust in democratic institutions, the results suggest that the effect of civic education depends directly on the stance that implementing groups take toward the current regime. When, as in the Dominican Republic, the groups doing the training are oppositionists, less trust results. In South Africa, where civil society tends to support the incumbents and the postapartheid institutional order, civics training produces more trust. Again, we see a fit between the general political stance of the groups that conduct civics training and that training’s overall effects.

There are practical pointers from the findings as well. For example, the results show plainly that when individuals are trained frequently and take an active part in their own learning, they will be substantially more likely to become engaged in politics and harbor attitudes favorable toward democracy. And yet it seems that all too often only a fraction of those who go through civics training actually do so under these promising conditions. For example, only a third of all civic education recipients in South Africa attended three or more workshops, and less than half of trainees were exposed to many active, participatory teaching methods. Given the problems that plague civic education in many emerging democracies—lack of funds, logistical difficulties, political turmoil in certain areas, and so on—policy makers need to take a hard look at how

their civic education programs are conducted. For if civic education cannot be done right, it most likely will not be worth doing at all.

Furthermore, the greater impact of civic education on citizens with higher levels of education, group involvement, and political interest suggests that civic education may have the side effect of widening existing disparities in politically relevant cognitive resources. Advocacy groups that do civic education commonly want to mobilize the marginalized and the inactive, and there is evidence that civic education does affect these types of individuals. And yet the most intense mobilizing effects often make themselves felt among those who are already better positioned to take part in politics, so in this way at least, civic education can have the effect of reinforcing political stratification. Policy makers need to be aware of this, since even successful civic education efforts appear to mobilize and “democratize” some groups more extensively than others.

Finally, the study provides strong support for the idea of having politically oriented NGOs, rather than more traditional civil society organizations, provide civics training in emerging democracies. Critics may complain that such “advocacy groups” are weak and lack local roots, but the findings reported here tell another story. Perhaps these groups make good agents of democratic change precisely because they are focused directly on that task, and provide more robust cues for participation and attitude change than do traditional civil society groups. Moreover, advocacy NGOs draw many of their civics trainees from existing civil society associations, which suggests that advocacy groups can work through and with the broader civil society. Thus it makes sense to fund civic education by such advocacy organizations—provided that they are prodemocratic in spirit, intent, and methods—in order to draw citizens into a closer embrace of the ideas and principles that make emerging systems more democratic.

NOTES

This study builds on collaborative work conducted over the past six years with Christopher A. Sabatini of the National Endowment for Democracy. Gwendolyn G. Bevis, Sheryl Stumbras, and Roberta Warren, all presently or formerly associated with Management Systems International, also had indispensable roles in the project. I thank them for all they have contributed. I thank Michael Bratton, Lynn Carter, Larry Cooley, Gary Hansen, James Gibson, Amanda Gouws, and Robert Mattes for advice and support at various stages of the project, and Adam Brown for skillful research assistance.

1. See especially Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, eds., *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000); Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

2. See Roxana Morduchowicz et al., "Teaching Political Information and Democratic Values in a New Democracy: An Argentine Experiment," *Comparative Politics* 28 (July 1996): 465–76; K.M. Slomczynski and G. Shabad, "Can Support for Democracy and the Market Be Learned in School? A Natural Experiment in Post-Communist Poland," *Political Psychology* 19 (December 1998): 749–79; and Judith Torney-Purta, Rainer Lehmann, Hans Oswald, and Wolfram Schulz, *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen* (Amsterdam: IEA, 2000). For programmatic evaluations of previous civic education efforts, see Sally Yudelman and Lucy Conger, *The Paving Stones: An Evaluation of Latin American Civic Education Programs* (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy, 1997) and Mark S. Johnson, *An Evaluation of Strengthening Russian Democracy Through Civic Education* (Washington, D.C.: National Endowment for Democracy, 1998). Impact evaluations can be found in Michael Bratton et al., "The Effects of Civic Education on Political Culture: Evidence from Zambia," *World Development* 27 (May 1999): 807–24; Steven E. Finkel, Christopher A. Sabatini, and Gwendolyn G. Bevis, "Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic," *World Development* 28 (November 2000): 1851–74; and Steven E. Finkel, "Civic Education and the Mobilization of Participation in Developing Democracies," *Journal of Politics* 64 (November 2002): 994–1020.

3. The study was commissioned by USAID's Center for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, and implemented by the Washington-based consulting company Management Systems International.

4. A total of 4,449 personal interviews were conducted altogether: 2,028 in the Dominican Republic, 1,481 in Poland, and 940 in South Africa. The data in the Dominican Republic were collected by the survey firm IEPD (Instituto de Estudios de Población y Desarrollo); in Poland by OBOP (Ośrodek Badań Opinii Publicznej); and in South Africa by Markinor research group. A complete listing of the programs that were included in the study is found on page 146 above, and more information about the sampling procedures and the questionnaire can be found at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/Finkel-14-4.pdf.

5. For the view that culture-related attitudes are likely to change relatively slowly, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little, Brown 1963) and Robert Rohrschneider, *Learning Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For evidence of short-term changes in democratic attitudes, see Russell Dalton, "Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies," *British Journal of Political Science* 24 (July 1994), and Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

6. See, for example, James Gibson, *Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic Persuasion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), and "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (July 1998): 819–50.

7. On the role of secondary associations in developing skills and participatory orientations, see Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Henry Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On social capital and democratization, see Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael W. Foley and Bob Edwards, "The Paradox of Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 38–52.

8. See especially Thomas Carothers, *Assisting Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*; and Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, eds., *Funding Virtue*.

9. Readers may find a full account of the findings, along with a description of the statistical methods that the study employed in order to screen out potentially confounding factors, at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/Finkel-14-4.pdf.

10. This theme is developed more fully in Steven E. Finkel, Christopher A. Sabatini, and Gwendolyn G. Bevis, "Civic Education, Civil Society, and Political Mistrust in a Developing Democracy: The Case of the Dominican Republic," *World Development* 28 (November 2000): 1851–74.

11. A table containing the full results of these analyses can be found at www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/Finkel-14-4.pdf.

12. See Henry Brady, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and Sidney Verba, "Prospecting for Participants: Rational Expectations and the Recruitment of Political Activists," *American Political Science Review* 93 (March 1999): 153–69.

13. Russell Dalton, "Communists and Democrats: Democratic Attitudes in the Two Germanies," 490.